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1 Introduction
Government support for the private provision of public goods is a much-debated issue in
the public economics literature. If voluntary contributions to the public good provision were
the base case, then each individual might contribute as much as she values the public good
which (ignoring the free rider problem) should yield an efficient outcome. Both the free
rider problem and the impossibility of government to impose taxation based upon individual
preferences result in inefficient taxation, and therewith in an inefficient private provision of
a public good. Kirchsteiger and Puppe (1997), for example, show how taxation may indeed
raise the total supply of a public good, but the taxation is unlikely to match the individual
utility of the good, a result which can also be found in Lahiri and Raimondos-Moeller (1998).
The ‘crowding-out thesis’ shows how government support on top of voluntary contributions
leads to a ‘dollar-to-dollar decrease’ in the voluntary contributions (see e.g. Roberts (1987),
Andreoni (1993), or Nyborg and Rege (2003)). In spite of all inefficiencies associated with
each possible type of taxation, fiscal and financial support still remain important instruments
for encouraging the private provision of public goods.
Independent the economic arguments against taxation and government support, this paper
addresses the question whether government support works in the encouragement of private
provision of public goods. Using a multi-case study, it analyses the effect of green policies
of the eu(15) countries on wind turbine investments in the 1985-2000 period. The effects
of these policies are evaluated by means of a uniform hypothetical investment project in a
1mw wind power plant for an overall evaluation criterion is proposed, based on Tobin’s Q.
The following specific questions will be addressed. First, why would government support
be necessary? Does the base-case yield sufficient financial attractiveness for private sector
investments, or do private sector investors need additional support? Second, what support
schemes are offered, and how do they affect the Q of the investment project? Third, does
the private sector provide the public good if Q becomes nonnegative? In other words, should
Q exceed unity for investors, or are nonnegative values sufficient? Given both the present
value of the support schemes, and given the response in investments, how have governments
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implicitly valued the public good? In other words, how much value-for-money have the
taxpayers received?
2 An evaluation criterion
Government support for the private provision of public goods through non-coercive instru-
ments can de facto be considered a nested optimisation problem within which government
designs a support scheme based on the anticipated response of the entrepreneurs. Therefore,
any evaluation criterion to be used here must take into account when it is economically at-
tractive for firms to invest. If the government support schemes analysed would only consist
of fiscal measures, then the calculation of an adjusted net corporate tax rate (cf. EC (2001),
or Devereux and Griffith (1998)) would be a logical choice. The green policies of the eu(15)
countries for the stimulation of wind turbine investments, however, consisted of a wide variety
of both fiscal and financial incentives, making it difficult to determine tax rates as referred to
above.
Now it might be possible to come up with a utility maximisation problem, where firms
maximise profits, and government her overall utility of the provision of the public good (ad-
justed for the support given). Unfortunately, however, in the absence of a uniformly accepted
valuation method for the public good ‘clean air’ (particularly when analysing multiple coun-
tries over a longer time horizon), this exercise would become a theoretical one, difficult to put
into operation. Therefore, the focus is initially directed towards finding the minimal partici-
pation constraints for the private sector to invest, and then analyse the suitable government
policies that should give the incentive to invest. The calculation of the firms’ participation
constraint forms the input for government’s expenditure minimisation problem. The entire
model floats on the intuition provided by Baumol (1990). In that paper, Baumol shows
how governments may influence the private sector’s activities without altering the preference
structure of firms. All government has to do is altering the payoff structure of the different
production options available to these firms.
A model that meets the criteria of calculating the corporate participation constraint, while
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capable of incorporating any type of fiscal or financial incentive, translated into a uniform eval-
uation criterion is the combination of the Hall-Jorgensonian neoclassical investment model,
combined with Tobin’s Q. The generalised forms of that combined model is readily worked
out by authors as Hayashi (1982), Auerbach (1983), or Abel, Dixit, Eberly, and Pindyck
(1996). Although the current paper formalises some additional functional forms of the fiscal
and financial incentives observed in the field, its main contribution lies in the empirical test,
rather than in the model itself.
2.1 A model
Wind turbines produce a private good ‘electricity’, X, sold at px, and a public good ‘avoided
emissions’, Y , which stems from a linear relationship with X:
Yjt = θjt ∗Xjt (1)
where θjt represents the avoided emissions in country j during year t. Firms investing in wind
turbines only receive the electricity wholesale market price, px, which is insufficient to make
a profit.1 Let wt be the wind regime determining total output of X. The wind regime may
vary over time and particularly geographical space. The public good Y arises costless as a
direct spin-off of the production of X. Wind turbines, installed in isolation or grouped as a
wind power plant, seem to be characterised by constant returns-to-scale.2 The production
technology yields a net income Rt, net of production costs C(X, k) where k is capital stock:
Rt = pxtwtXt(kt)− wtCt(Xt, kt) (2)
1I.e., wind turbine plants are price-takers in the market for the private good. If they were not, they might
have added a mark-up on the private good in order to compensate for the costlier production technology that
also yields a public good (cf. the lighthouse in economics problem, specified by Coase (1974)). Obviously,
such setting requires a different optimisation technique, for which it turns out very difficult to calculate an
observable Q (see Hayashi (1982)).
2See, for example, a recent Worldbank paper ‘Statistical analysis of wind farm costs and policy regimes’,
available at: www.worldbank.org/astae/windfarmcosts.pdf.
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for which the evolution of the firm’s capital stock is described as follows. Let the next-period
value of the firm’s capital kt+1 be represented by:
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + ψ(It) (3)
where δ is the physical depreciation rate (see Abel (1982)), and It the investment in capital
goods at time t. Since not all investments It are necessarily turned into capital, Uzawa (1969)
introduces the so-called ‘installation function’ ψ(It), which implies that only ψ ∗ It percent
of investment is turned into capital. Note that, when defining k˙ ≡ kt − kt−1, then (3) can be
rewritten as:
k˙ = −δkt + ψ(It) (4)
This expression provides the necessary condition for maintaining a long-run capital stock,
constant over time (cf. Gould (1968)). Let the initial present value of a firm now be given
by:
V0 =
∫ ∞
t=0
pite
−rwacctdt (5)
where pit are the after-tax net profits, discounted at the capm-based average cost of capital,
rwacc, for which:
pit = (1− Tc)Rt + Tc(rdtDt +DeprtmtIt)− (1− Sinv)mtIt +
∫ ∞
0
As,t−sds (6)
where Tc is the corporate tax rate, TcDeprtmtIt the tax shield on the economic depreciation
Deprt, applicable to the initial investment. Investments may be subsidised or given another
rebate at rate Sinv in year 0. All allowances applicable to past investments of age s are
captured in the last integral, As,t−s, referring to the sum of all allowances for investments
of age s, concerning policies initiated at time t − s. The idea behind this notion of age is
that changes in policies do not have a retrospective effect. In order to avoid the necessity
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for adjusting these equations for each individual economic instrument analysed in this paper,
table 1 summarises the present value of each of them.
—————————
Insert Table 1 about here
—————————
The generalised objective function for a firm becomes:
max
{It,kt}∞0
Vt =
∫ ∞
t=0
[
(1−Tc)Rt+Tc(rdtDt+DeprtmtIt)−(1−Sinv)mtIt+
∫ ∞
0
As,t−sds
]
e−rtdt,
(7)
subject to: k˙ = ψ(It).
Introducing λt as the Lagrange multipliers for this problem, and defining qt ≡ λtert, the
current value Hamiltonian can now be specified as:
Hc = (1−Tc)Rt+Tc(rdtDt+DeprtmtIt)−(1−Sinv)mtIt+
∫ ∞
0
As,t−sds+qt
[
ψ(It)− k˙t
]
, (8)
In this expression, the firm can freely determine the control variable It. The state-variable
(the one determined by past decisions) is the capital stock kt, and the shadow value of the
state variable (i.e., the co-state variable) is qt. Analyzing the case for which As,t−s = At, the
first-order condition (f.o.c.) with respect to investment now becomes:3
∂Hc
∂It
=
[
TcDeprtmt − (1− Sinv,t)mt + ∂At
∂It
+ qt
∂ψ(It)
∂It
]
e−rt = 0
⇔ qt =
(TcDeprt + Sinv,t − 1)mt + ∂At∂It
ψ˙(It)
(9)
This expression immediately illustrates the long-run equilibrium notion of q = 1: The nom-
inator, namely, equals the net benefit of installing an additional unit of capital stock; it
includes all tax benefits, subsidies and allowances, and is corrected for the purchase price of
3The terminal endpoint transversality conditions have been defined such that at t = T , the capital stock
kt should be zero. With a little rewriting, as T → ∞, this yields limt→∞ qte−rt[−δkt + ψ(It) − k˙t] = 0. The
initial endowments are set equal to zero (i.e., k0 = 0).
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an additional unit of capital stock. The denominator, on the other hand, gives the costs of an
additional unit of capital stock. One the nominator equals the denominator, the firm should
be indifferent with respect to investing. The other f.o.c.s are ignored here.4
The obvious drawback of the marginal Q derived in this model, is that it need not be
observable. Nevertheless, since the model assumes firms are price-takers in the market for the
private good output, and both the production and installation functions are homogeneous,
we can follow Hayashi (1982), by equalling marginal and average Q. Hayashi expresses the
latter as:
qt =
Vt
mtkt
=
1
mtkt
∫ ∞
t=0
[
(1−Tc)Rt+Tc(rdtDt+DeprtmtIt)−(1−Sinv)mtIt+
∫ ∞
0
As,t−sds
]
e−rtdt (10)
This average Q will be used throughout this paper as the central evaluation criterion for the
impact of fiscal and financial incentives on a (hypothetical) investment decision. It captures
the impact of each instrument on the Q value of the investment decision, which essentially
represents an npv subject to a long-run sustainability restriction.
3 The base-case
At the heart of this paper lies a 1mw wind turbine investment project, for which the finan-
cial attractiveness is calculated both in the base-case as well as in the alternative scenarios
(including fiscal and financial incentives). Before making these calculations, the base-case
assumptions are specified.
3.1 Base-case assumptions and data sources
The main variables used for the base-case are summarised below.
4Obviously, ∂H/∂Qt gives an expression for k˙t, whereas ∂H/∂kt yields some q˙t. Only ∂H/∂kt will be
derived in 5.1. For ∂H/∂Qt, the reader is either asked to do the derivations, or to look up Hayashi (1982),
Auerbach (1983), or Abel (1982).
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Investment costs and annual costs
The costs of wind turbines have decreased rapidly over time. The exact figures vary per
manufacturer, but in general terms investment costs have dropped with about 5.5% per annum
over the 1985-1995 period, and have decreased with about 3% afterwards.5 In concrete terms,
the investment costs of a 1mw wind power plant have dropped from about e1.8m in 1985 to
about e900k in the year 2000. Apart from the investment costs, the annual operation and
maintenance costs have dropped as well. Simultaneously, however, the average costs of land
use have risen over time. These two costs developments are assumed to offset each other, so
that constant annual operating and maintenance costs (including land rental) are set at e40k
for the entire period.
Financing costs and the use of debt
Many wind power projects are fully debt financed.6 Full debt financing not only lowers the
discount rate, but also maximises the tax shield from debt. In order to let full debt financing
de realistic, a collateral is assumed to be present, which is uncorrelated with the market value
of the installed capital stock, and which is provided at zero cost. Though an annual 6%
interest rate is assumed on bank debt, the project may still suffer from some contingencies.
Therefore, a somewhat higher discount rate of 7.36% will be used for the analyses.7
Economic lifespan and depreciation
The choice for the economic lifespan of a wind turbine varies between 10 and 15 years:
commercial banks assume an economic life span of 10 years, whereas advocates of wind power
use a longer lifespan. Here, a 15 years’ lifespan has been used. In the base case, a linear
depreciation for that lifespan is used in order to calculate the tax shield on depreciation.
Prices and currencies
For the sake of uniformity, all prices, costs, and benefits have been expressed in Euros.8 Most
5This estimate is consistent with the ones reported by Faber, Green, Gual, Haas, Huber, Resch, Ruijgrok,
and Twidell (2001), EC (1997), and BTM (1999). These sources, however, use a broader bandwith within
which the figures used for this paper fit. See also UCE, STS, ECN, Ecofys, and RIVM (2001), for a review of
the long-run cost projections of both onshore and offshore wind farms.
6A 2001 report by Bear Stearns ‘German wind farm developers’, European Equity Research, described how
leverage ratios of 0.6 to 0.7 are commonplace.
7This discount rate is the result of a capm analysis, using an rf of 5%, an rd of 6%, an asset β of 0.69, and
an E(rm) of 10%. When numerically increasing leverage ratios, the rwacc increases up to some 7.36%.
8Since the Euro did not exist before 01 January 2002, the DMark has been used as a reference for calculating
the exchange rate with the Euro, ecu, and pre-ecu standards.
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countries have applied output-related incentives as fixed feed-in tariffs or production subsidies.
For the years where no price-related regulation was available (for most countries, this was the
1985-1990 period), wind power producers were assumed to could have sold their electricity at
wholesale prices (representing avoided costs of production). Since it proved difficult to obtain
wholesale prices for all countries, particularly in the pre-1990 period (most electricity sectors
were nationalised) the ex-tax industry price has been used as a proxy. Of course, industry
prices may have been subsidised, and do not represent truly avoided costs of production, but
in the absence of better data the iea uses the same methodology.
For some countries, other specific assumptions have been made. For example, wherever
price deflation occurred in Italy, Sweden, Greece, Portugal, and Austria, the electricity retail
price index has been used, due to an absent wholesale price deflator for the electricity sector.
For Spain, the National Renewable Energy plans (starting back in 1986) regulated favourable
buy-back tariffs. The 1998 Royal Decree explicitly gave wind power producers the option
to choose between (a) the wholesale price plus a premium, or (b) a fixed price of about
e62.6/mwh. For the sake of simplicity, and to avoid the aforementioned problem of obtaining
the true wholesale prices, the fixed price has been applied. Since no exact regulated price
data could be obtained for the 1986-96 period, the fixed e62.6/mwh price has been applied to
that entire period. Since in Spain the government has traditionally determined the electricity
prices for the different consumer categories, no electricity wholesale price index was available
to deflate the fixed tariff.
In Greece, the feed-in tariff for independent power producers (ipps) has been regulated
since 1985. Since no historical feed-in tariff data were obtained, the 1994 legislation (where
ipps receive 90% of the grid price) has also been applied to the pre-1994 period (deflated at
the wholesale price index).
In Portugal, the conditions for ipps to deliver to the national grid have been regulated
since 1988. In 1998, wind power was guaranteed a pte10.48/kwh price. Since no historical
data were obtained, and since no wholesale price index was available, this price has been
deflated by using the electricity retail price index.
For Luxembourg, neither industry nor wholesale price data were available, as holds for
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the price indices. Given the relatively high retail prices, and furthermore the enormous inter-
connection with the Belgium economy (e.g., during the entire period observed the currencies
of both countries were interchangeable) the data for the Belgium market have been applied
to the Luxembourg case for the period before specific feed-in tariff regulations occurred (that
is, before 1994).
For constructing a base-case feed-in tariff, the average 1985 ex-tax industry prices have
been used for the eu(15), deflated by the real energy price index for industrial end-users in
oecd Europe. This results in base-case prices varying from e51.9/mwh in the year 1985
(start), via e53.8/mwh in 1990 (highest), to e44.9/mwh in the year 2000 (lowest and last).
These prices have been applied uniformly to all countries in the sample. The rationale for
uniform base-case feed-in tariffs is that it was impossible to obtain wholesale prices for the
sample period. Most countries did not have a true wholesale market in that era, and their
prices were in fact artefacts determined by law or Parliament. For example, in Spain gov-
ernment set all prices, varying between industries, etc. Industry-specific energy prices have
been frequently applied, and have often been used as some form of subsidies. Therefore, using
country-neutral base-case prices may eliminate some part of this implicit subsidisation. As a
consequence, however, the present value of the differences between the real-price vectors and
base-case price vectors may yield negative subsidies there.
Wind regime
A crucial factor that affects the profitability of a wind turbine investment project in the
various countries is the wind regime. The wind regimes given by BTM (2000) have been
used, cross-checked with the data provided by the European Wind Energy Association.
Fiscal regime
For most countries, the statutory corporate tax rates provided by the Institute of Fiscal
Studies (ifs) have been used. Since the ifs data do not cover Denmark and Luxembourg,
these corporate tax rates were assumed to equal 32% and 37% respectively for the entire
sample period.
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3.2 Base-case Q
Using the above assumptions, the base-caseQs calculated for investment in wind turbines have
steadily remained below unity over time. Figure 1 shows the calculated Qs of an investment
in a hypothetical 1mw wind power plant in the 1985-2000 period. The base case shows that
not a single positive Q (let alone one exceeding unity) was calculated.
—————————
Insert Figure 1 about here
—————————
A sensitivity analysis on these results with respect to the assumptions yields the following
results. The capital-intensive nature of wind turbine projects by definition makes the out-
comes very vulnerable to changes in the level of the initial investment. A change of 10% in
the investment costs triggers similar responses in the base-case Qs. Jumping ahead to the
net analysis (including fiscal and financial incentives) this sensitivity is smoothened for most
of the individual countries, either due to investment subsidies, or due to the tax shield on
depreciation, investment reliefs, etc. Changes in the discount rate show a similar pattern. For
example, if the debt-to-equity ratio changes from full debt financing to a D/E ratio of one,
the wacc slightly increases to 7.9%. More important, however, is the fact that the tax shield
from debt decreases. For the base-case, this has a moderate effect. For countries as Denmark
and Spain (corporate tax rate comparable to the base-case) the impact is smoothened. In the
case of Spain, this is because of the investment subsidy-given a lower capital need, the impact
of a change in the finance structure is more limited too. In the case of Denmark, the income is
much higher than in the base-case (due to production subsidies and high feed-in tariff), which
limits the impact of changes in the tax shield, etc. In the case of Germany, however, the tax
benefits drop dramatically, which can be attributed to the high corporate tax rate of 52%.
These effects are multiplied for a full equity financed project. If the asset beta is increased
from 0.69 to 1.00, the discount rate increases to 8.9%. The base-case Qs then drop slightly, an
effect that is replicated in the case of Germany. In Denmark and Spain the increased discount
rate hardly has any effect on Q. An increase of the operating costs with 10% (i.e., e4k per
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annum) is of minor importance to the project. Overall, it appears that the Q calculations are
rather stable. The variables most sensitive to changes are related to the capital structure and
to the investment amount. Particularly the tax shield from debt has a multiplying effect here.
4 Policies affecting Q
4.1 Description of green policies
Table 2 reviews the national policies for encouraging wind turbine investments during the
1985-2000 period. For some countries as Austria, Spain, and Belgium, table 2 includes some
regional policies as well. These governments have transferred some policies to non-central
governments, so that inclusion of these regional policies makes the overview more accurate.
Nevertheless, the empirical assessment has been predominantly restricted to the policies at
the national level. Legislation that has come into force after 31 December 2000 has not been
included in this review, since the available data on installed wind turbine capacity have at
least a two years’ time lag before being published, which would hamper an assessment of the
effects of these policies. Since the focus is on a 1mw wind power plant, stimuli for households
(such as auto-consumption projects for rural areas), as well as niche-market applications of
wind power have been excluded. Production subsidies and subsidies on capital investments
appear to be the two most popular instruments in the various national policies. Favourable
feed-in tariffs have also been a common practice.
—————————
Insert Table 2 about here
—————————
4.2 Present value of green policies
Given the policies listed in table 2, and given the analytical framework provided in section
2.1 (in particular the specifications given in table 1), it now becomes possible to calculate
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the present value of the various fiscal and financial incentives, given a base-case 1mw wind
turbine investment project. Figure 2 shows the present value of all economic instruments
listed in table 2.
—————————
Insert Figure 2 about here
—————————
Any discussion of the financial attractiveness of the different economic instruments should
emphasize the fundamental difference between the ’bidding programme’ countries, and the
others. Under a non-bidding programme, firms apply for a subsidy or other incentive, and
may increase their capital stock up to the long-run economic equilibrium. The governments
of both the uk and Ireland, however, decided to launch bidding programmes for encouraging
investments in renewable energy. Under such programme, the number of eligible projects
(and therewith the capital stock) is specified on forehand, as is the budget available. Firms
can join a tender and demand for subsidies. The firms demanding the lowest subsidies are
eligible, whereas all the other projects (demanding too much support) are not. In theory, this
is a very nice mechanism. That shield yield efficient outcomes. Particularly when assessing
ex post how high the granted support has been in the uk, then it turns out that the nffo
bidding programme was anything but efficient (particularly the 1990-94 period is striking).
A more technical issue with respect to the bidding programmes is concerned with the
impulse-response function, as will be tested in the regression analysis below. When the
number of projects eligible for government support is uncapped, then the market determines
the efficient investment response. Under a bidding programme, however, it is the number
of eligible projects that has been fixed on forehand, whatever the financial attractiveness of
the measures. Thus, for any Q above unity (even if it were 3), the response is the same.
Therefore, the uk and Ireland are considered outliers in the sample, and will not be included
in the econometric analysis.
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4.3 Q including incentives
When including the present value of the various economic instruments, the Qs increase enor-
mously relative to the base-case. Figure 3 gives the ‘net Qs’. This graph shows a grid surface
that intersects with the Q=1 value. Even though this Q=1 value need not represent the
long-run equilibrium value for which q˙ = 0 (this will be discussed in the next section), it does
provide a minimum value for that condition.
—————————
Insert Figure 3 about here
—————————
When analysing the Q values including incentives, it appears that none of the countries
in the sample provided positive Qs at the start of the sample period. Also, all countries
had nonnegative Qs at the end of the sample period. Though strictly speaking Q should at
least be one for a long-run sustainable industry, nonnegative Qs might attract ’single shot’
investments. These do not generate sufficient income to ensure an infinitely lived industry,
but they might attract some investments.
Of all countries, the Qs for the uk can safely be labelled excessive. As the present value of
the economic instruments already suggested, wind turbine investments were very profitable
during the 1990-94 period in the uk. Though some countries provided little incentives, rela-
tively high Qs were obtained. For example, the Dutch government has hardly provided serious
incentives before 1995, but the Qs during the pre-1995 period have not been dramatically low
(oscillating around the Q=0 value). Such anomalies are attributed to the favourable wind
regimes of such countries, or the relatively low corporate tax rates.
On the downside, the Qs obtained for Ireland are dramatically low, and in fact (given the
investments in turbines revealed in the next section) also low Qs were obtained for Denmark.
In this particular case, it must be noted that in Denmark, households own about 50% of all
wind turbines. Since the stimuli given in table 2 did not include stimuli for households, the
Qs obtained for Denmark have a downward bias relative to the empirical reality.
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Also, a general comment holds for all countries with low accumulated levels of wind
turbines. Usually, when a product-market is in its start-up phase, additional subsidies are
available for market development. For renewable energy, both national governments and
the EU have specific subsidy programmes. Including these may explain the residual growth
observed with currently negative Qs.
5 Investment response to green policies
Annual iea/oecd data on the installed wind turbine capacity have been used for each country.
These data have some limitations. First, since only some countries have reported wind turbine
capacity per ownership class (public, ngo, private) whilst these distinctions have not been
made from the start, aggregates have been used for all countries similarly for the sake of
uniformity. As a consequence, even if the calculated Qs would be negative, one may observe
growth in investments. This ‘autonomous’ growth is attributed to either (a) public sector
investments, since public enterprises are assumed to use another evaluation criterion than
micro-level Q, or (b) the fact that for premature markets, additional market development
subsidies are often available. Table 2 does not include these kinds of subsidies, which might
lead to an underestimate of Qs for markets with low levels of accumulated turbine capacity.
A second remark concerns replacements. Since only aggregate figures were available, the
data reflect net investments, and should actually be corrected for replacement investments.
Therefore, the gross investment figures might be higher. A consequence of this data limitation
is that we may now observe a negative growth in turbine capacity in Luxembourg between
1998 and 1999, whilst in reality there might have been a positive gross investment in that
period.
Figure 4 gives an impression of the cumulative investment figures for the four largest in-
vesting countries (ranked by their year 2000 capital stock). The net investment data for all
countries in the sample can be found in table 3 in the appendix to this paper.
—————————
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Insert Figure 4 about here
—————————
Germany, Denmark, and Spain are by large the biggest investors in wind turbines. Partic-
ularly when assessing the cumulative year 2000 figures, the gap between these three countries
and the rest of the sample becomes even more apparent. When calculating the marginal
growth rates of the capital stock in all countries, then it appears that the largest investors
in cumulative terms have had their peak in the late 1980s or early-1990s. Ever since, these
growth rates have been lower than 100%.
Interpreting declining growth rates (for example in the three largest investing countries)
as saturation, it seems that if there is growth to be expected it should come from the smaller
wind turbine countries. As such, declining growth need not be bad: if an industry approaches
her long-run equilibrium, the only investments that should be made are the replacement
investments, necessary to cover the depreciation of the existing capital stock. In order to
analyse this equilibrium hypothesis, we need to analyse the phase diagrams. Before turning
to the phase diagrams, however, the average Qs are calculated given the realised capital stock.
The reason for this calculation is that–opposed to figure 3–some incentives have been capped
per annum, or per eligible project. Consequently, the calculations visualised in figure 3 may
be characterised by an upward bias in Qs. Imposing a cap thus gives the minimum level of
Qs possible.
Two approaches have been worked out. First, it was assumed that each country were
served by a single investor-that is, all investments made in year t represented a single invest-
ment project. Under this assumption, the subsidies and tax allowances have been capped
for a number of countries, limiting the value of Q. Figure 5 outlines the results. The most
striking Q-values were obtained for the uk (about 5 in 1991), Italy (over 3 in 1995), and
Ireland (over 3 in 1996). The only two other countries for which Qs bigger than unity were
obtained, were Belgium (1997) and Germany (1989 and 1993). In the second approach, the
restriction that all investments represented atomistic projects was removed, and allowed the
maximum incentives possible. Under this scenario, the Qs had to be bigger than under the
first approach, but still less than in figure 3. Figure 6 shows how much bigger they were.
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In the remainder, the second approach (the higher values for average Q)has been used for
making two types of analysis. First, the relationship between Q and capital stock is discussed
theoretically (analysed from the perspective of phase diagrams), in order to critically assess
the long-run equilibrium implications. Second, a panel data regression analysis is performed.
—————————
Insert Figure 5 about here
—————————
—————————
Insert Figure 6 about here
—————————
5.1 From Q to capital stock: Phase diagrams
In economic dynamics, the relationship between a state variable (i.e., the one determined by
past decisions, which is capital stock kt here) on the horizontal axis and a co-state variable
(i.e., the shadow value of the state variable, which is Qt here) can be readily expressed by
means of a so-called phase diagram. In such diagram, the long-run equilibrium is determined
by the intersection of two lines: the line for which k˙t = 0, and for which Q˙t = 0. The first line,
for which k˙t = 0 implies that, by equation 4, ψ(It) = δkt. In words, net investment equals
physical depreciation. When assuming that wind turbines do not face a significant physical
depreciation over their economic lifespan, then δ = 0, which implies ψ(It) is a horizontal line.9
By equation 9, we know it should intersect the vertical axis at q = 1.
The second line, for which Q˙t = 0, needs some small calculations before it can be inter-
preted. Q˙t = 0 is obtained by means of the f.o.c. of the Hamiltonian with respect to capital
stock, that is, ∂H/∂kt. When firms optimise the present-value Hamiltonian, the motion of
the co-state variable would have been described by ∂H/∂kt = −λ˙t.10 When plugging in
9If δ were postive, then increases in k would lead to higher depreciation, so that the slope of this line were
upwards. See Abel (1982) for a full proof of this statement.
10Note that equation 8 represents a current-value Hamiltonian.
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the definition of qt, and by differentiating qt on the left-hand side, a little rewriting yields:
q˙te
−rt − rqte−rt = −∂Hc∂qt e−rt, which can be rewritten as:
q˙t = −∂Hc
∂qt
+ rqt (11)
Thus, Q is constant (q˙t = 0), when the user cost of capital (rqt) equals the marginal rev-
enue product of capital. Since wind turbines are characterised by constant returns-to-scale,
∂Hc/∂qt is decreasing in k.11 Thus, in (k,Q) space, the line for which q˙t = 0 is downward-
sloping in k.
At a glance, it seems we have sufficient theoretical grounds for plotting the long-run
equilibrium of the capital stock. Unfortunately, however, the partial derivative ∂Hc/∂qt is
unobservable. In the absence of sound theoretical conditions for which the marginal effects
would equal the average ones, a phase diagram cannot be used in practice. Nevertheless, we
can make a first step by plotting all (k,Q) pairs in a diagram. Figure 7 gives such plot for
the same four countries used in figure 4.
—————————
Insert Figure 7 about here
—————————
This graph shows how the (k,Q) pairs for Germany and Spain nicely oscillate around
the k˙t = 0 line. Ignoring the results for Denmark (see the note in section 4.3), we can see
how the incentives given in the Netherlands do not meet a long-run sustainability criterion:
Having peaked in 1996 at a 0.96 value, the Qs for wind turbines in the Netherlands have
steadily diverted from unity. Although the wind turbines’ capital stock in the Netherlands
still increases after its 1996 peak, the marginal growth figures are clearly declining.
11This assumption holds if the demand curve for the industry’s output is downward sloping. Then, optimi-
sation of the present-value Hamiltonian with respect to kt would be downward sloping in k. This is equal to
a downward-sloping partial derivative of the current-value Hamiltonian with respect to q.
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5.2 From Q to capital stock: A panel data regression
There exist numerous regression models for estimating a relationship between Tobin’s Q
and corporate investment-varying from relatively simple ols models to dynamic panel data
models using gmm estimates. The common denominator in all econometric models is the
problem of the unobservable installation function. Net investments can be observed, but
gross investments cannot. It is beyond the scope of this study to come up with a ’new’
regression model. The only purpose any regression model would have here is to confirm that
higher Q’s yield more investments, and that such relationship has a consistent pattern. A
simple model that meets these criteria is given by Blundell, Bond, Devereux, and Schantarelli
(1992), which is very similar to the one provided by Hayashi (1982). The intuition is as
follows. First, investment is triggered by changes in Q and the partial derivative of the firm’s
profit maximisation problem with respect to investment (i.e., ∂Hc/∂It), of which the latter
yielded (see 9):
∂Hc
∂It
=
[
TcDeprtmt − (1− Sinv,t)mt + ∂At
∂It
+ qt
∂ψ(It)
∂It
]
e−rt = 0
A little rewriting gives:
−TcDeprtmt + (1− Sinv,t)mt − ∂At
∂It
= qt
∂ψ(It)
∂It
(12)
The next step is to recall the Euler equation describing the evolution in Q, which is given by:
∂Hc
∂kt
=
(
1− Tc
)∂Rt
∂kt
+
∂At
∂kt
+ qt
∂ψ(It)
∂kt
− qt∂k˙t
∂kt
= 0
Rearranging this equation yields:
qt
∂k˙t
∂kt
−
(
1− Tc
)∂Rt
∂kt
− ∂At
∂kt
= qt
∂ψ(It)
∂kt
(13)
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Multiplying (12) by It, and (13) by kt, and taking the difference of the resulting equations
now yields:12
k˙tqt = mtIt
(
1− Sinv,t − TcDeprt
)
− (1− Tc)Rt
The left-hand side of this equation expresses the market value of I units of additional invest-
ments. On the right-hand side, we find the market costs of the additional unit of investment.
The direct investment costs mtIt are lowered by the investment subsidies and investment tax
credits. With each additional unit of investment also an amount of revenues R are foregone,
due to the constant returns to scale and the downward sloping demand curve. Firms will
thus invest up to the point where the benefits of an additional unit of investment equal the
costs. Following Lucas Jr. (1967), the first derivative of the gross investment function (which
is assumed to be homogeneous of degree one) with respect to I can be treated as a function
of the ratio I/k. Then, equation (12) can be rewritten as:
qt
(1− Sinv)mt − TcDeprtmt − ∂At∂It
=
1
∂ψ(It)
∂It
, (14)
which we can solve for I to obtain the optimal investment rule:
I = γ
(
q˜t, kt
)
,
where q˜t (hereafter referred to as ‘modified Q’) is the left-hand side of equation (14), being:
q˜t =
qt
(1− Sinv)mt − TcDeprtmt − ∂At∂It
. (15)
In words, modified Q is essentially equal to the marginal Q derived above, albeit that it is
adjusted for the fiscal and financial investment incentives. Following Hayashi (1982), (15) can
12This trick was inspired by Poterba and Summers (1982). Note that since the revenues R are decreasing in
k, ∂R/∂k must be negative. After multiplying equation (13) with k, a negative sign has been added to R.
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be reduced to:
It
kt
= β(q˜t), (16)
for which the ols regression becomes:
(I
k
)
it
= αi + βi(q˜it) + ²it (17)
The biggest objection to running individual time series regressions, however, is that many
countries have very little variation in the dependent (see table 3). That data limitation can
be overcome by means of a panel data regression. Assuming that all investors respond in a
similar fashion to Q, a common effects panel data model of the following form will be used:13
(I
k
)
it
= α+ β(q˜it) + ²it (18)
The regression analysis yields a β of 0.74, with a standard error of 0.082, and a t-statistic of
8.897, which suggests the β is very significant. A Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.89 suggests
there is very little serial correlation in the error term. An important implication of this
regression analysis is that it does not seem to matter too much what exact policy instruments
are used, as long as the project becomes financially sustainable. Hence, it seems that firms
have equal preferences for investment subsidies or tax rebates, as long as they yield the same
results. Probably, this result only holds for a macro-context within which macroeconomic and
political stability are present, and where government commitment to whatever instrument is
guaranteed for a minimum time period. If this would not be the case, then the international
business literature suggests that entrepreneurs prefer those incentives that have immediate
spin off, such as an investment subsidy. Other instruments, as production subsidies or tax
holidays over a longer time span become less attractive when macroeconomic or political
instability increase.
13In addition to this model, a non-linear panel data model has been regressed (with a breakpoint at Q = 1).
Due to the limited number of observations for Q ≥ 1, however, the breakpoint dummy could not be made
statistically significant.
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6 Government valuation
Although the core of this paper has focused on the participation constraint for the private
sector to invest, one may wonder how the generosity of governments pays off. In other words,
how much ‘value for money’ have the taxpayers received? A first step is an analysis of the
average co2 emissions from power generation per country, shown in figure 8.
—————————
Insert Figure 8 about here
—————————
The production of every mwh of renewable energy not only implies an avoidance of these
emissions, but also helps to lower the average emissions of the sector. Therewith, by every
installment of renewable energy generating capacity, the marginal benefits for government
(society) decreases, and so might government support.
When dividing the present value of all fiscal and financial incentives a 1mw wind power
plant may receive over its 15 years’ lifespan by the product of the average emissions (in
tonnes co2/mwh) times the wind regime (in hours per annum), we obtain the implicit ‘value
for money’ for the taxpayer, or the implicit government valuation (expressed in e/tonne co2).
Table 4 gives the results.
—————————
Insert Table 4 about here
—————————
Most studies valuing the the marginal abatement costs of co2 vary between nil and e250 per
tonne.14 The results obtained in table 4 seem to fit fine within that bandwidth.
Most important, however, is that these figures provide a completely different interpretation
of the ‘generosity’ of the various governments. In the above analysis of the Tobin’s Q values,
countries as the uk seemed to exaggerate their economic incentives. When relating the tax
14See for example Blok, Jager, Hendriks, Kouvaritakis, and Mantzos (2001).
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money spent to the avoided emissions in such country over the lifespan of a wind turbine,
however, then it appears the the uk has been generous, but not so much as France (ignoring
the environmental costs of nuclear power production in the latter country), or Luxembourg.
7 Conclusions
The literature on the private provision of public goods emphasizes the funding problem,
and is sceptical about government support. For example, in the case where the private
provision of public goods relies on voluntary donations, government support would ‘crowd
out’ these donations. This paper has shown that in a market where firms are price-takers
and where the provision of the public good is coupled with the provision of a private good
(the latter combination being a popular setting for most research in the private provision
of public goods) government support does encourage firms to invest. Using a framework
based on Tobin’s Q, the empirical analysis suggest that for nonnegative Qs investments are
boosted. This result represents a major relaxation of the theoretical benchmark, requiring Qs
to exceed unity. Apparently, although Q equalling unity is necessary and sufficient condition
for long-run sustainability, investors suffice with a nonnegative NPV on their investment.
This result is very informative on the possibility for governments to intervene in the private
sector investment process.
In addition, the results also suggest that it is the financial attractiveness of that gov-
ernment support which matters, and not so much the mixture of instruments applied. This
result would provide a major relaxation for investment support programmes, as at the end
of the day, investors only seem interested in earning a reasonable return on their investment.
Probably, this result only holds in stable economies (no hyperinflation, etc.) and for credible
government commitment (i.e., promised measures must be executed).
The main conclusions of the paper can be summarised as follows. First, wind turbine in-
vestments appear to be very sensitive to higher marginal revenue products of capital. Second,
investments do not seem to respond differently to tax incentives or subsidies; what matters
is the financial attractiveness of these measures. The most frequently observed instruments
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were the capital investment subsidy, the production subsidy, and the tax relief on investments.
Other measures, including accelerated depreciation, or even soft loans were utilised, but were
less frequent. Third, in countries where the national average emissions per unit of electricity
output are high, governments provide more generous incentives for renewable energy produc-
tion. Fourth, the countries with the largest wind turbines investment figures (absolute levels)
have faced decreasing growth levels since the mid-1990s. This is attributed to congestion of
suitable sites. Fifth, the realized spin-off from the fiscal and financial measures varies widely
over both time and space, but it is difficult to obtain a consistent pattern here.
A major limitation of the study is rooted in the available data. The annualised national
wind turbine data did not allow for testing a very extended model, due to the limited variation
in the dependent variable, a low frequency of the data, and no consistent discrimination on
ownership types (i.e., investments owned by government, ngos, private sector companies, or
households). Though these limitations make it extremely difficult to come up with a very
precise relationship between incentives and investment response, the data do suggest a clear
pattern between financial attractiveness on the one hand, and net investments on the other.
Theoretically, it would be possible to determine the long-run equilibrium of the investments
(and therewith also the support necessary to reach that equilibrium) by means of phase
diagrams. In practice, however, it appears to be extremely difficult to come up with such a
diagram. Nevertheless, some elements of such diagrams have been sketched.
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8 Tables and figures
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Table 1: Present value of some economic instruments
Economic instrument Present value
Favourable, guaranteed feed-in
tariffs (fixed prices)
(1− Tc)
∫ T
0 (px,s,t−s − px,s,t−s)wtXte−rf (t−s)ds
Production subsidy (per unit of
output)
(1− Tc)
∫ T
0 Soutput,s,t−swt−sXt−se
−rf (t−s)ds
Production subsidy (per unit of
capacity installed)
(1− Tc)
∫ T
0 Scapacity,s,t−sks,t−se
−rf (t−s)ds
Subsidy on capital investment Sinv,tmtIt
Subsidy on interest rates
∫ T
0 pit(e
−rnewwacc(t−s) − e−roldwacc(t−s))ds -
Tc
∫ T
0 (rd,t − rsoft,s,t−s)Dt−se−rwacc(t−s)ds
Tax relief on investments (per-
centage deduction of capital in-
vestment costs)
TcAinv,t−sms,t−sIs,t−s
Reduced corporate tax rate (T regularc −T reducedc )
∫ T
0 (Rt−rd,tDt−δtmtIt)e−rwacctdt
Accelerated depreciation
∫ 1/δ˜
0 TcDepr
accel
s,t−sms,t−sIs,t−se−rwacc(t−s)ds -∫ 1/δ
0 TcDepr
base−case
s,t−s ms,t−sIs,t−se−rwacc(t−s)ds
Note: In this table, p˜ refers to the favourable price; rf is the risk-free interest rate, used for
discounting all guaranteed (and thus risk-free) policy measures; Soutput is a production subsidy per
unit of output; Scapacity a subsidy for adding additional capacity to the grid; D is the amount of debt
used for financing the investment; rd the coupon rate of conventional (bank) debt; rsoft the coupon
rate of a so-called ‘soft loan’; δ is the rate of economic depreciation for which holds δ = 1/T ; and δ˜
the rate of accelerated depreciation.
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e
re
m
ov
al
of
th
at
ca
pi
ta
l
su
bs
id
y
in
19
89
,t
he
fix
ed
pu
rc
ha
se
pr
ic
e
re
m
ai
ne
d.
B
y
th
e
en
d
of
20
00
,t
he
85
%
ru
le
ha
s
be
en
te
rm
in
at
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b
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ca
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d
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d
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b
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at
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d
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d
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ic
it
y,
w
hi
ch
w
as
no
t
ap
pl
ic
ab
le
to
ut
ili
ty
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re
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at
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re
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ra
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ra
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at
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ra
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m
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ra
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w
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e
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m
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b
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P
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ra
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re
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is
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at
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d
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is
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at
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n
fo
r
15
ye
ar
s,
w
it
h
a
lo
ng
er
lif
es
pa
n.
O
n
av
er
-
ag
e,
n
f
f
o
-3
(1
99
5-
20
12
)
pa
id
g
b
p
0.
05
29
/k
w
h,
w
he
re
as
n
f
f
o
-4
(1
99
7-
20
17
)
pa
id
g
b
p
0.
04
57
/k
w
h.
n
f
f
o
-5
(1
99
8-
20
19
)
pa
ys
g
b
p
0.
04
18
/k
W
h.
Sw
ed
en
S
u
b
si
d
y
on
ca
p
it
al
in
ve
st
m
en
t:
T
he
19
91
E
ne
rg
y
P
ol
ic
y
B
ill
(1
99
1-
19
96
)
fa
ci
lit
at
ed
in
ve
st
m
en
t
su
pp
or
t
to
w
in
d
po
w
er
.
O
ri
gi
na
lly
,a
25
%
su
bs
id
y
w
as
gr
an
te
d,
bu
t
la
te
r
th
is
be
ca
m
e
35
%
fo
r
pl
an
ts
>
60
kw
.
Fr
om
m
id
-1
99
6
to
m
id
-1
99
7,
no
su
bs
id
ie
s
w
er
e
av
ai
la
bl
e.
T
he
Ju
ne
19
97
pa
rl
ia
m
en
ta
ry
de
ci
si
on
on
en
er
gy
po
lic
y
gr
an
ts
15
%
of
th
e
ca
pi
ta
l
co
st
s
fo
r
ne
w
w
in
d
tu
rb
in
es
>
20
0k
w
(t
hi
s
su
bs
id
y
is
ex
pe
ct
ed
to
be
re
du
ce
d
to
10
%
so
on
).
P
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
su
b
si
d
y
:
Si
nc
e
01
.0
7.
19
94
,
w
in
d
po
w
er
pr
od
uc
er
s
re
ce
iv
e
a
so
-c
al
le
d
‘E
nv
ir
on
m
en
ta
l
B
on
us
’,
eq
ua
lli
ng
th
e
ex
ci
se
ta
x
on
el
ec
tr
ic
it
y
fo
r
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
.
T
hi
s
bo
nu
s
di
ffe
rs
pe
r
re
gi
on
(h
ig
he
st
in
so
ut
he
rn
an
d
ce
nt
ra
l
Sw
ed
en
),
an
d
eq
ua
lle
d
se
k
11
3/
m
w
h
(1
99
6)
,
se
k
13
8/
m
w
h
(1
99
7)
,
se
k
15
2/
m
w
h
(1
99
8)
,
an
d
se
k
18
1/
m
w
h
(2
00
0)
.
In
ad
di
ti
on
to
th
e
re
gu
la
r
pr
ic
e
pa
id
fo
r
el
ec
tr
ic
it
y
(a
nd
th
e
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l
bo
nu
s)
,
fr
om
19
97
un
ti
l
th
e
en
d
of
20
01
,
a
sp
ec
ia
l
su
bs
id
y
of
se
k
0.
09
/k
w
h
w
as
gi
ve
n
fo
r
sm
al
l-
sc
al
e
w
in
d
po
w
er
pr
od
uc
ti
on
un
it
s
(<
1.
5m
w
).
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T
ab
le
2:
O
v
er
v
ie
w
of
gr
ee
n
p
ol
ic
ie
s
C
ou
n
tr
y
D
es
cr
ip
ti
on
of
fi
sc
al
an
d
fi
n
an
ci
al
m
ea
su
re
s
G
re
ec
e
S
u
b
si
d
y
on
ca
p
it
al
in
ve
st
m
en
t:
L
aw
18
92
/1
99
0
pr
ov
id
es
(a
.o
.)
ca
pi
ta
l
in
ve
st
m
en
t
su
bs
id
ie
s
up
to
45
%
(1
99
0-
19
93
).
T
he
‘O
pe
ra
ti
on
al
P
ro
gr
am
m
e
fo
r
E
ne
rg
y’
o
p
e
(1
99
4-
19
98
)
ac
co
m
pa
ny
in
g
L
aw
22
44
/1
99
4
su
b-
si
di
se
s
w
in
d
en
er
gy
pr
oj
ec
ts
w
it
h
40
%
(u
p
to
g
r
d
35
0,
00
0/
kw
su
bs
id
is
ed
pr
oj
ec
t
co
st
s)
.
L
aw
26
01
/1
99
8
(i
n
fo
rc
e
19
99
-o
nw
ar
ds
)
gi
ve
s
fir
m
s
in
ve
st
in
g
in
R
E
S
pl
an
ts
th
e
ch
oi
ce
of
ei
th
er
re
ce
iv
in
g:
(a
)
A
40
%
ca
pi
ta
l
su
bs
id
y,
pl
us
an
in
te
re
st
ra
te
su
bs
id
y
(4
0%
of
th
e
in
te
re
st
pa
id
on
lo
an
s
fo
r
R
E
S
eq
ui
pm
en
t
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
),
pl
us
a
40
%
le
as
in
g
su
bs
id
y,
or
(b
)
A
ta
x
de
du
ct
io
n
eq
ua
lli
ng
10
0%
of
th
e
in
ve
st
m
en
t
co
st
s,
pl
us
th
e
af
or
e-
m
en
ti
on
ed
in
te
re
st
ra
te
su
bs
id
y.
T
he
ta
x
de
du
ct
io
n
cr
ea
te
s
a
ta
x-
ex
em
pt
re
se
rv
e
th
at
ac
cu
m
ul
at
es
un
ti
l
to
ta
l
in
ve
st
m
en
t
co
st
s
ha
ve
be
en
re
cu
pe
ra
te
d
(w
it
hi
n
up
to
10
ye
ar
s)
.
P
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
su
b
si
d
y
:
U
nd
er
la
w
15
59
/1
98
5,
au
to
-p
ro
du
ce
rs
an
d
ip
p
s
w
er
e
al
lo
w
ed
to
se
ll
a
lim
it
ed
am
ou
nt
of
re
ne
w
ab
le
en
er
gy
to
th
e
st
at
e-
ow
ne
d
el
ec
tr
ic
it
y
co
m
pa
ny
p
p
c
.
In
19
88
,t
he
ta
ri
ff
st
ru
ct
ur
e
fo
r
pu
rc
ha
si
ng
re
ne
w
ab
le
el
ec
tr
ic
it
y
by
p
p
c
w
as
re
gu
la
te
d.
U
nd
er
la
w
22
44
/1
99
4,
au
to
-p
ro
du
ce
rs
an
d
ip
p
s
w
er
e
al
lo
w
ed
to
in
st
al
l
up
to
50
m
w
.
Fu
rt
he
rm
or
e,
it
re
gu
la
te
s
pr
ic
es
be
tw
ee
n
p
p
c
an
d
in
de
pe
nd
en
t
po
w
er
pr
od
uc
er
s,
co
ns
is
ti
ng
of
an
en
er
gy
an
d
a
ca
pa
ci
ty
co
m
po
ne
nt
.
T
he
en
er
gy
co
m
po
ne
nt
fo
r
ip
p
s
se
lli
ng
to
an
in
te
rc
on
-
ne
ct
ed
gr
id
is
90
%
of
th
e
sa
le
s
pr
ic
e.
In
19
97
,
fo
r
w
in
d
pl
an
ts
de
liv
er
in
g
at
m
ed
iu
m
vo
lt
ag
e
(6
.6
-2
2k
v
),
th
is
sa
le
s
pr
ic
e
eq
ua
lle
d
g
r
d
18
.7
9/
kw
h
(e
c
u
0.
05
7)
;w
he
n
de
liv
er
in
g
at
th
e
hi
gh
-v
ol
ta
ge
gr
id
(1
50
kv
),
th
re
e
su
b-
zo
ne
s
ha
ve
th
ei
r
ow
n
pr
ic
es
.
T
he
ca
pa
ci
ty
co
m
po
ne
nt
eq
ua
ls
50
%
of
th
e
am
ou
nt
p
p
c
ch
ar
ge
s
at
th
e
en
d-
us
er
s,
w
hi
ch
is
m
ul
ti
pl
ie
d
by
0.
50
fo
r
w
in
d
en
er
gy
.
In
19
97
,
th
e
ca
pa
ci
ty
cr
ed
it
fo
r
w
in
d
pr
od
uc
er
s
de
liv
er
in
g
at
th
e
m
ed
iu
m
vo
lt
ag
e
gr
id
w
as
g
r
d
24
1/
kw
(.
5*
.5
*g
r
d
96
4)
pe
r
m
on
th
(e
c
u
0.
72
6)
,
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
ov
er
th
e
m
ax
im
um
m
ea
su
re
d
po
w
er
pr
od
uc
ti
on
ov
er
th
e
bi
lli
ng
pe
ri
od
.
T
he
hi
gh
vo
lt
ag
e
gr
id
re
m
un
er
at
es
hi
gh
er
ca
pa
ci
ty
pa
ym
en
ts
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
on
th
e
ba
si
s
of
th
e
m
ax
im
um
m
ea
su
re
d
po
w
er
pr
od
uc
ti
on
be
tw
ee
n
tw
o
su
cc
es
si
ve
m
ea
su
re
m
en
ts
in
th
e
pe
ak
ho
ur
zo
ne
.
B
ot
h
re
m
un
er
at
io
ns
th
us
sh
ow
se
as
on
al
it
y
as
pe
ct
s.
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T
ab
le
2:
O
v
er
v
ie
w
of
gr
ee
n
p
ol
ic
ie
s
C
ou
n
tr
y
D
es
cr
ip
ti
on
of
fi
sc
al
an
d
fi
n
an
ci
al
m
ea
su
re
s
Ir
el
an
d
A
cc
el
er
at
ed
d
ep
re
ci
at
io
n
:
It
is
as
su
m
ed
(t
ho
ug
h
th
is
is
de
ba
te
d)
th
at
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
in
w
in
d
tu
rb
in
es
m
ay
op
t
fo
r
th
e
15
%
ta
x
de
pr
ec
ia
ti
on
p.
a.
al
lo
w
an
ce
fo
r
pl
an
ts
an
d
m
ac
hi
ne
ri
es
(v
is
-a`
-v
is
th
e
4%
p.
a.
fo
r
in
du
st
ri
al
bu
ild
in
gs
).
T
ax
re
li
ef
on
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
:
Si
nc
e
19
80
,a
10
%
ta
x
ra
te
ap
pl
ie
s
to
a
sp
ec
ifi
ed
ra
ng
e
of
ec
on
om
ic
ac
ti
vi
ti
es
,
in
cl
ud
in
g
el
ec
tr
ic
it
y
ge
ne
ra
ti
on
(t
he
cu
rr
en
t
‘n
or
m
al
’
ta
x
ra
te
is
28
%
).
Si
nc
e
18
.0
3.
19
99
(o
pe
ra
ti
ng
fo
r
2
ye
ar
s)
,
th
e
19
98
F
in
an
ce
B
ill
al
lo
w
s
a
ta
x
re
lie
f
fo
r
eq
ui
ty
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
in
R
E
S
pr
oj
ec
ts
un
de
r
ce
rt
ai
n
re
st
ri
ct
iv
e
co
nd
it
io
ns
.
S
u
b
si
d
y
on
ca
p
it
al
in
ve
st
m
en
t:
T
he
a
e
r
-3
pr
og
ra
m
m
e
off
er
ed
ca
pi
ta
lg
ra
nt
s
e
80
,0
00
pe
r
m
w
in
st
al
le
d.
P
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
su
b
si
d
y
:
Si
nc
e
19
94
,
fiv
e
‘A
lt
er
na
ti
ve
E
ne
rg
y
R
eq
ui
re
m
en
t’
(a
e
r
)
pr
og
ra
m
m
es
ha
ve
be
en
la
un
ch
ed
,
of
w
hi
ch
a
e
r
-1
a
e
r
-3
,
an
d
a
e
r
-5
ap
pl
y
to
w
in
d
po
w
er
.
T
he
a
e
r
s
ar
ra
ng
e
15
-y
ea
rs
’
pu
rc
ha
se
co
nt
ra
ct
s
w
it
h
th
e
Ir
is
h
ut
ili
ty
e
sb
;
th
e
pr
ic
es
in
cr
ea
se
an
nu
al
ly
w
it
h
r
p
i
in
fla
ti
on
.
T
he
a
e
r
s
re
gu
la
te
th
e
pr
ic
e
ca
p,
bu
t
th
e
re
al
pr
ic
es
ar
e
se
tt
le
d
th
ro
ug
h
a
bi
dd
in
g
pr
oc
es
s.
U
nd
er
a
e
r
-1
(1
99
4-
19
96
),
R
E
S
pr
od
uc
er
s
w
er
e
pa
id
a
fix
ed
ta
ri
ff
fo
r
a
15
-y
ea
rs
’
pe
ri
od
of
ie
p
0.
06
1-
0.
06
4/
kw
h
du
ri
ng
w
ee
kd
ay
s
(a
bo
ut
e
c
u
0.
08
),
an
d
e
ip
0.
02
4-
0.
02
5/
kw
h
du
ri
ng
th
e
w
ee
ke
nd
s.
a
e
r
-3
(1
99
7-
19
99
)
re
gu
la
te
s
a
pr
ic
e
ca
p
fo
r
w
in
d
en
er
gy
,
w
he
re
as
th
e
su
cc
es
sf
ul
bi
ds
en
de
d
at
ie
p
0.
02
21
/k
w
h
(e
c
u
0.
02
8)
,
w
hi
le
th
e
m
ax
im
um
w
in
d
po
w
er
pl
an
t
ha
d
be
en
fix
ed
at
15
m
w
.
a
e
r
-5
ha
s
be
en
an
no
un
ce
d
in
A
ug
us
t
20
01
,
an
d
is
no
t
di
sc
us
se
d
he
re
.
P
or
tu
ga
l
S
u
b
si
d
y
on
ca
p
it
al
in
ve
st
m
en
t:
In
P
or
tu
ga
l,
in
ve
st
m
en
t
su
bs
id
ie
s
ha
ve
be
en
co
ns
id
er
ed
th
e
ke
y
in
st
ru
-
m
en
t
to
pr
om
ot
e
th
e
us
e
of
R
E
S.
T
w
o
pr
og
ra
m
m
es
ha
ve
pr
ov
id
ed
ca
pi
ta
li
nv
es
tm
en
t
su
bs
id
ie
s:
th
e
E
ne
rg
ia
P
ro
gr
am
m
e
an
d
th
e
m
a
p
e
/p
o
e
P
ro
gr
am
m
e.
T
he
E
ne
rg
ia
P
ro
gr
am
m
e
(1
99
4-
19
99
)
gr
an
ts
up
to
50
%
ca
pi
ta
l
su
bs
id
ie
s
of
to
ta
l
in
ve
st
m
en
t
co
st
s
fo
r
di
ss
em
in
at
io
n
(c
om
m
er
ci
al
is
at
io
n)
pr
oj
ec
ts
,
w
it
h
a
ca
p
of
p
t
e
50
m
ln
(a
bo
ut
e
c
u
24
9k
)
fo
r
w
in
d
pr
oj
ec
ts
.
P
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
su
b
si
d
y
:
T
he
19
88
D
ec
re
e
L
aw
18
9
re
gu
la
te
s
co
nd
it
io
ns
un
de
r
w
hi
ch
ip
p
s
m
ay
de
liv
er
to
th
e
na
ti
on
al
gr
id
;
it
fu
rt
he
rm
or
e
in
cl
ud
es
pr
ov
is
io
ns
fo
r
fa
vo
ur
ab
le
pr
ic
es
.
In
19
98
,
th
e
pr
ic
e
fo
r
w
in
d
en
er
gy
w
as
p
t
e
10
.4
8/
kw
h.
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T
ab
le
2:
O
v
er
v
ie
w
of
gr
ee
n
p
ol
ic
ie
s
C
ou
n
tr
y
D
es
cr
ip
ti
on
of
fi
sc
al
an
d
fi
n
an
ci
al
m
ea
su
re
s
A
us
tr
ia
O
th
er
fi
sc
al
m
ea
su
re
s:
Si
nc
e
01
.0
8.
19
95
,a
n
O
rd
in
an
ce
of
th
e
Fe
de
ra
lM
in
st
er
of
Fo
re
ig
n
A
ffa
ir
s
gu
ar
an
-
te
es
m
in
im
um
pr
ic
es
fo
r
R
E
S
po
w
er
,
va
ry
in
g
fr
om
a
t
s0
.4
21
/k
w
h
to
a
t
s0
.9
/k
w
h
(r
at
es
fo
r
pl
an
ts
<
2m
w
,
de
pe
nd
in
g
on
th
e
ti
m
e
of
de
liv
er
y)
.
T
he
19
98
‘E
le
ct
ri
ci
ty
B
us
in
es
s
an
d
O
rg
an
is
at
io
n
L
aw
’(
e
lw
o
g
,i
n
fo
rc
e
fr
om
19
99
on
w
ar
ds
)
st
at
es
th
at
th
e
fe
de
ra
l
pr
ov
in
ce
s
ha
ve
to
fix
th
e
fe
ed
-i
n
ta
ri
ffs
fo
r
R
E
S
po
w
er
.
Fu
r-
th
er
m
or
e,
re
ne
w
ab
le
el
ec
tr
ic
it
y
m
ay
no
w
be
so
ld
di
re
ct
ly
to
an
y
cu
st
om
er
.
T
he
se
fe
ed
-i
n
ta
ri
ffs
no
t
on
ly
di
ffe
r
pe
r
pr
ov
in
ce
,
bu
t
al
so
pe
r
se
as
on
(s
um
m
er
or
w
in
te
r)
,
w
it
hi
n
w
ee
ks
(w
or
ki
ng
da
ys
or
w
ee
ke
nd
s)
,
an
d
th
ro
ug
ho
ut
th
e
da
y
(d
ay
ti
m
e
or
ni
gh
ts
).
O
n
av
er
ag
e,
th
e
fe
ed
-i
n
ta
ri
ffs
va
ry
be
tw
ee
n
e
0.
04
0/
kw
h
an
d
e
0.
04
9/
kw
h.
S
u
b
si
d
y
on
ca
p
it
al
in
ve
st
m
en
t:
In
th
e
19
92
-9
6
pe
ri
od
,
th
e
L
aw
of
E
nv
ir
on
m
en
ta
l
P
ro
te
ct
io
n
pr
ov
id
ed
up
to
30
%
ca
pi
ta
l
in
ve
st
m
en
t
su
bs
id
ie
s.
Si
nc
e
Ju
ly
19
97
,
th
e
‘P
ro
m
ot
io
n
In
st
ru
m
en
t
fo
r
E
le
ct
ri
ci
ty
fr
om
R
en
ew
ab
le
s’
(p
ie
r
)
pr
ov
id
es
(a
.o
.)
ca
pi
ta
l
su
bs
id
ie
s.
T
he
ca
pi
ta
l
su
bs
id
ie
s
ar
e
ca
pp
ed
to
pr
ov
id
e
no
t
m
or
e
th
an
a
7%
ra
te
of
re
tu
rn
fo
r
15
ye
ar
s.
P
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
su
b
si
d
y
:
In
ad
di
ti
on
to
th
e
fe
ed
-i
n
ta
ri
ff,
th
e
M
in
is
tr
y
of
E
co
no
m
ic
A
ffa
ir
s
si
gn
ed
a
‘v
ol
un
ta
ry
ag
re
em
en
t’
(F
eb
ru
ar
y
19
94
)
w
it
h
th
e
ut
ili
ty
fir
m
s
of
ad
di
ng
a
bo
nu
s
to
ip
p
s
fo
r
a
3
ye
ar
s’
pe
ri
od
af
te
r
th
e
co
ns
tr
uc
ti
on
of
a
R
E
S
pl
an
t
(f
or
pl
an
ts
co
ns
tr
uc
te
d
be
fo
re
31
.1
2.
19
96
–t
ho
ug
h
so
m
e
ut
ili
ti
es
co
nt
in
ue
d
th
is
bo
nu
s
pa
ck
ag
e
un
ti
l
ea
rl
y
19
98
).
Fo
r
w
in
d
po
w
er
,
th
is
bo
nu
s
w
as
10
0%
.
T
hi
s
ag
re
em
en
t
ap
pl
ie
d
to
th
e
19
94
-1
99
6
pe
ri
od
.
Fr
om
Ju
ly
19
97
on
w
ar
ds
,
th
e
p
ie
r
pr
ov
id
es
al
l
in
ce
nt
iv
es
fo
r
R
E
S.
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T
ab
le
2:
O
v
er
v
ie
w
of
gr
ee
n
p
ol
ic
ie
s
C
ou
n
tr
y
D
es
cr
ip
ti
on
of
fi
sc
al
an
d
fi
n
an
ci
al
m
ea
su
re
s
Fr
an
ce
2
A
cc
el
er
at
ed
d
ep
re
ci
at
io
n
:
Si
nc
e
19
93
,p
ri
va
te
co
m
pa
ni
es
in
ve
st
in
g
in
R
E
S
pr
oj
ec
ts
m
ay
de
pr
ec
ia
te
th
ei
r
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
w
it
h
10
0%
in
on
e
ye
ar
.
T
ax
re
li
ef
on
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
:
Si
nc
e
19
93
,
pr
iv
at
e
co
m
pa
ni
es
in
ve
st
in
g
in
R
E
S
pr
oj
ec
ts
m
ay
ap
pl
y
fo
r
a
re
du
ce
d
co
rp
or
at
e
in
co
m
e
ta
x
ra
te
(5
0%
re
du
ct
io
n)
.
O
th
er
fi
sc
al
m
ea
su
re
s:
T
ho
ug
h
th
e
19
46
la
w
co
nc
er
ni
ng
th
e
na
ti
on
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Figure 1: Base-case Qs
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Figure 2: PV of economic instruments
42
GER
DEN
NET
ITAUK
SWE
IRE
POR
FRA
FIN
LUX
1985
1986
1988
1989
1991
1992
1994
1995
1997
1998
2000
–0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Figure 3: Q including instruments
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Figure 4: Capital stock for four selected countries
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Figure 5: Qs assuming a single investor per country
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Figure 6: Qs assuming multiple investors per coun-
try
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Figure 7: Combined diagram of four countries in
(k,Q) space
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